Jean Monnet Chair

Informujemy, że członek zespołu JMC EUCRIS, dr Adam Kirpsza, wziął udział w 25th IPSA World Congress of Political Science. Kongres odbył się w dniach 21-25 lipca 2018 r. w Brisbane w Australii i był zorganizowany przez IPSA (International Political Science Association). Dr Kirpsza brał udział w panelu pt. Governing, Representation and Democracy kierowanym przez Prof. Johna Fossuma z Uniwersytetu w Oslo, w czasie którego przedstawił paper pt. To Package, or Not to Package? Explaining Issue Linkage in the European Union Lawmaking. Poniżej znajduje się paper w wersji pdf.

To Package, or Not to Package? Explaining Issue Linkage in the European Union Lawmaking

Abstrakt papera:

The purpose of this paper is to empirically indentify factors that affect the EU legislators’ propensity to adopt EU legislation through issue-linkage within single co-decision proposals. Issue-linkage deals (also referred to as package deals) are informal agreements between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU concerning one or more legislative proposals, in which both institutions link issues and exchange their preferences. It is estimated that 19% of EU legislative acts adopted under the co-decision is decided through logrolls within one legislative file. The paper delineates and tests eight hypotheses predicting the impact of specific variables on the occurrence of single package deals. They are derived from two pivotal theories: rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. A logistic regression model is used to verify the hypotheses on a dataset consisting of all EU legislative acts adopted under the co-decision during the fifth and sixth term of the European Parliament (1999-2009). The analysis reveals that the issue-linkage within single co-decision proposals is systematically related to the size of negotiation space (measured by the number of conflicting issues and the proposal complexity), legislative workload, country coherence between the EP rapporteur and the Council Presidency, socialization and the EP committee’s experience in dealing with co-decision files. In addition, the likelihood of concluding within-legislation logrolls increases when the proposal is regulatory technical and regulatory redistributive, whereas it decreases with the duration of negotiations.