

Good Things Come In Small Packages? The Effect of Issue Linkage on Member States' Bargaining Success in European Union Lawmaking

By

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Paper prepared for the 26th IPSA World Congress of Political Science, 10-15 July 2021.

Abstract:

This paper investigates how inter-institutional issue linkage (package lawmaking) affects member states' bargaining success in European Union lawmaking. Issue linkage is defined as informal bargaining between the European Parliament and the Council in relation to a single or several proposals where both institutions exchange support for their preferred outcomes. While about 25% of EU legislation is decided through package deals and this share is growing, little is known about their impact on states' success. The paper seeks to fill this lacuna. Drawing from the logrolling and *relais actors* theories, it expects that package lawmaking increases states' bargaining success and is beneficial for countries holding a) extreme preferences, b) the EP rapporteurship or the Council Presidency, and c) superior power resources. The hypotheses are tested by a multi-level linear regression on the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al., 2012). Overall, contrary to expectations, member states are less successful in attaining their preferences under package deals. However, this effect varies with the type of issue linkage as multi-proposal packages decrease countries' bargaining success, while single proposal logrolls rather increase it. The paper argues that this finding stems from the distinct characteristics of the two types of logrolls. Moreover, the analysis reveals that logrolling favors states with extreme preferences and those holding the rapporteur and presidency. By contrast, powerful states are not better off when a package deal is concluded. Finally, the paper unveils that logrolling generates a relatively symmetric distribution of success among member states, contrary to conventional negotiations which produce clear winners and losers.

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INTRODUCTION¹

One of the peculiarities of the European Union's legislative process that has recently become particularly apparent, is the increasing amount of legislation decided through inter-institutional package deals. These are informal agreements concluded between the representatives of the two EU legislative institutions – the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union - where they exchange support for their most preferred policy outcomes across different types of issues nested in a single or several legislative proposals. In the literature, such form of trade has been referred to as 'logrolling' or 'issue linkage' (Poast, 2012; Stratmann, 1997; Tullock, 1970). Informal logrolls reached by the EP's and Council's representatives are then formally approved without amendment through voting within the respective institutions to become law.

The past two decades have witnessed the increasing use of package deals in EU lawmaking. It is estimated that approximately 25% of the legislation was concluded through issue linkage between 1999 and 2007 (Kardasheva, 2013: 861). Notably, we observe a growing tendency: while only 21% of proposals were decided through package deals in 2000, more than 41% of the proposals were package compromises in 2006. This trend continues today, as evidenced by the following two references included in the 8th EP Activity Report for the period 2014-2019: "The Commission tabled fewer proposals during the 8th mandate than its predecessors. It did so in part by adopting proposals in packages, covering several policy fields at a time" (McGuinness et al., 2019: 3) and "One of the distinctive features of the current parliamentary term was the scope of many Commission proposals. A significant number were broad, cross-policy proposals" (McGuinness et al., 2019: 7).

Despite becoming an inherent feature of the EU legislative process, package deals have so far received limited theoretical and empirical attention in the literature on EU legislative decision-making. Theoretically, several exchange models have been developed in the analysis of EU legislative decision-making, notably the position-exchange model (Stokman and Van Oosten, 1994), the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita, 1994), the spatial model (Crombez, 2000), or the procedural exchange model (König and Proksch, 2006). Empirically, previous research has explained the reasons for concluding package agreements (Kardasheva, 2013) as well as have investigated how issue linkage affects the position changing in EU lawmaking (Aksoy, 2012), the speed of EU decision-making (Kirpsza, 2017), member states'

¹ The research for this paper has been financed by the Poland's National Science Center (grant no. 2015/17/D/HS5/00420).

choice of bargaining strategies (McKibben, 2010; 2013) or consensus-building in the Council (König and Junge, 2009; McKibben and Western, 2014). In addition, several studies have scrutinized the distributional consequences of logrolling for bicameral negotiations in the EU. Kardasheva (2009; 2013) found that package deals increase the probability of the European Parliament's success in legislative outcomes under the consultation and co-decision procedures. However, Franchino and Mariotto (2013) did not reveal any effects of package legislation on parliamentary success in conciliation proceedings under co-decision.

Yet, the existing literature involves one important lacuna that constitutes the rationale for this paper. Despite the increasing relevance of package deals in the EU legislative process, still little is known about their genuine effect on the bargaining success of member states which are represented in the Council of the EU. While there is a growing literature explaining states' bargaining power and satisfaction in EU lawmaking (Aksoy, 2010; Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Arregui, 2016; Bailer, 2004; Cross, 2013; Golub, 2012; Lundgren et al., 2019; Rasmussen and Reh, 2013; Thomson, 2011; Warntjen, 2017), no study has so far scrutinized issue linkage as a determinant of states' preference attainment.

This contribution seeks to fill the above gap by investigating how package deals concluded between the EP and the Council affect member states' bargaining success in the EU legislative process. In doing so, we derive three hypotheses from the theory of logrolling (Buchanan and Tullock, 2004; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1994; Tollison and Willett, 1979). First, we expect inter-institutional logrolling to generally increase states' bargaining success compared to conventional issue-by-issue agreements, as it allows them to reach mutually advantageous compromises by exchanging support for their most preferred outcomes. Second, we theorize that states with extreme preferences benefit more from package deals, as they are more likely to realize their extremist preferences by trading concessions in issues they care less about in return for gains in issues on which they hold more extreme and intense preferences. Third, we expect big member states to be more successful when a package deal is concluded, due to their ability to deliver sufficient majorities in the process of formally approving informal logrolls within the Parliament and the Council. In addition, we draw on the theory of *relais actors*, developed by Farrell and Héritier (2003, 2004), and hypothesize that package deals are advantageous to countries holding two privileged institutional positions - the rapporteur and the Council Presidency, since these figures are mainly responsible for concluding and enforcing informal logrolls. Our hypotheses are tested using a multi-level linear model on the DEUII dataset which includes 331 issues nested in 125 controversial legislative proposals introduced

between 1996 and 2008 under the co-decision and consultation procedures (Thomson et al., 2012).

Overall, contrary to our expectations, we find that EU member states are significantly less successful in attaining their preferences when a package deal is concluded. However, this effect varies with the type of logrolls as multi-proposal package deals decrease countries' bargaining success, while single proposal package deals rather increase it. Moreover, in line with our expectations, states with extreme preferences attain higher bargaining success under package deals than under non-package agreements. The analysis also supports our *relais actors* hypotheses as logrolls are beneficial to member states holding the rapporteurship and the Council Presidency during the decisive negotiations. However, we do not find evidence that big member states are better off when a package deal is concluded. Finally, the analysis reveals that in contrast to conventional agreements, issue linkage produces a rather symmetric distribution of bargaining success without clear winners and losers.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the context of EU lawmaking, legislative package deals can be defined as informal compromises agreed between the European Parliament and the Council where both institutions reconcile their conflicting policy positions on legislation by exchanging their support across multiple issues. Issues are not decided on a case-by-case basis, but are linked to one another and decided as a package. For instance, the Council accepts the EP's amendments on the issue A (e.g., strengthening data protection), which is more important for the EP, in return for which the EP supports the Council's position on the issue B (e.g. reduction of the budget), which is more crucial for the member states. In other words, both institutions exchange loss in one issue, usually less important for one of them, for gains in the other issue, usually more important. Issue linkage is therefore a cooperative form of negotiation that leads to that are mutually beneficial compromises (Buchanan and Tullock, 2004: 96; Tajima and Fraser, 2001; Tollison and Willett 1979). It allows each legislator to attain its preferred policy outcomes and achieve an overall compromise that is more satisfactory than what could be attained during classical, issue-by-issue negotiations, which generally produce unequivocal winners and losers.

Two types of package deals can be observed in the EU legislative process: a single proposal package deal (also known as 'omnibus') and a multi-proposal package deal (Kardasheva, 2013). The former is concluded when the EP and the Council trade their support for issues within a single legislative proposal. The example is the Financial

Regulation/Omnibus adopted in 2018 (2016/0282A/COD). By contrast, multi-proposal package deal is agreed on several multi-issue proposals which can fall under the same or different legislative procedures. In this case, the EP and the Council exchange their support for issues which are bundled in a couple of interrelated and simultaneously negotiated acts. The example is the 2017 First Mobility Package which involved three proposals: the Posting of Workers Directive (2017/0121/COD), the Off-Cabin Rest Regulation (2017/0122/COD) and the Access to the Profession Regulation (2017/0123/COD). In the literature, the first type of issue linkage is also referred to as within-legislation logrolling, while the second as cross-legislation logrolling (Aksoy, 2012: 542).

Package deals are usually agreed in trilogues – informal and secluded inter-institutional meetings between the representatives of the Council, the EP, and the Commission (Brandsma, 2015). In most cases, the Council is represented by the rotating Presidency, the EP by a negotiation team led by the rapporteur, but also including the shadow rapporteurs, the EP committee chair and/or political group coordinators, while the Commission delegation is composed of a deputy-director general, relevant heads of unit or commissioner (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015). When the representatives reach a package agreement during trilogue negotiations, they sent it to the Parliament and the Council for formal adoption. In order to become law, any informal package deals have to be approved without further amendments through voting by each institution.

Given that package deals have become a standard operating procedure in the EU legislative process, the following question arises: what are their consequences for member states' bargaining success? To assess this research problem, we delineate and test five hypotheses derived from the theories of logrolling and *relais actors*. Specifically, we expect that package deals between the EP and the Council increase the bargaining success of EU member states compared to traditional issue-by-issue agreements, and are particularly beneficial to countries that a) exhibit extreme preferences, b) hold rapporteurship or presidency during the decisive negotiations, and c) enjoy high power resources.

Our first general expectation is that inter-institutional package deals generally increase member states' bargaining success in EU lawmaking. This hypothesis is derived from the literature on logrolling, arguing that issue linkage allows to achieve mutually beneficial solutions for all parties involved in multi-issue negotiation (Buchanan and Tullock, 2004: 96; Tajima and Fraser, 2001: 220; Tollison and Willett 1979). When legislators hold diverging policy preferences on several issues and attach different salencies to them, they may find it profitable to engage in legislative exchange. Through the linkage of issues in packages, actors

can trade losses in some issues, usually less important to them, for benefits in other issues, usually more important in value, resulting in a mutually advantageous overall compromise. The exchange of favors allows legislators to attain their most preferred outcomes and avoid gridlock by reaching speedy agreement on legislation. Against this background, we expect issue linkage to be more profitable to members states than adopting EU legislation in traditional negotiations. When the Parliament and the Council reach a package deal, member states – which make up the latter institution - receive further opportunities for securing their favourable outcomes by trading gain in the issues they care about the most, in return for loss in less salient issues. This is impossible in the case of conventional negotiations where each issue is decided on a case-by-case basis, thereby producing winners and losers in decision-making. Therefore:

H1: Issue linkage increases the bargaining success of member states in EU lawmaking.

However, inter-institutional package deals may not always be equally satisfactory to all member states. The literature on logrolling suggests that the specific structure of legislation, in particular the number of issue dimensions it has, the distribution of actors' preferences, issue saliency, or decision-making rules can cause some legislators to be more capable of trading favors than the others (Aksoy, 2012; Kardasheva, 2013; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1994). As a result, they are better positioned to exploit logrolling opportunities in order to secure their favorable bargaining outcomes. Based on this, we expect inter-institutional package deals to be more beneficial to countries holding extreme preferences on EU legislation. Previous research has found that states with extreme preferences are generally less successful in achieving their preferred outcomes (Arregui, 2016; Bailer, 2004; Lundgren et al., 2019). The availability of package deals should however strengthen their negotiating position. States with extreme preferences can capitalize on logrolling opportunities to increase their bargaining success by trading concessions in issues they care less about in return for gains in issues on which they hold more extreme and intense preferences. As a result, they are more likely to move the final outcome closer to their extreme policy positions, thereby obtaining an overall legislative compromise that is more favorable than that resulting from case-by-case, issue-by-issue negotiations. Hence:

H2: Issue linkage increases the bargaining success of member states that hold extreme policy positions on EU legislation.

Since package deals are reached in informal negotiations, their effect on states' bargaining success may be conditional on the characteristics of the so-called *relais actors*.

These are key representatives of Council and Parliament in trilogues, notably the rotating Presidency on the Council's side and a negotiation team led by the rapporteur on the EP's side. Some scholars argue that the informalization of the decision-making process, stemming from the widespread use of trilogues since 1999 (Reh et al., 2013), has empowered the EP rapporteur and the Presidency *vis-à-vis* their institutions, giving them disproportionate influence over the course and outcomes of legislative negotiations (Brandsma and Hoppe, 2021; Costello and Thomson 2010: 223; Farrell and Héritier, 2003; 2004). Specifically, the restricted and secluded nature of trilogues allows the *relais actors* to deviate from their institution's instructions and capitalize on the lack of transparency in order to reach a legislative compromise that is favourable to their individual preferences. In line with this *relais actors* thesis, we expect package deals to be more beneficial to member states holding the rapporteurship in the EP or the presidency in the Council during key negotiations on a proposal. By deciding legislation through issue linkage, these figures may use their privileged position to attain the most preferred policy outcomes for their states by exchanging losses in issues that are less salient to their countries, for gains in issues to which they attach higher levels of importance. Thus:

H3: Issue linkage increases the bargaining success of member states that hold the EP rapporteurship.

H4: Issue linkage increases the bargaining success of member states that hold the Council Presidency.

The literature on issue linkage also emphasizes that logrolls face the enforcement problem (McKibben and Western, 2014; Poast, 2012: 283). Inter-institutional package deals are fragile informal agreements that have to be formally approved by the members of the EP and the Council without any further amendment. This means that key negotiators need to ensure the required majority within their parent legislatures for the vote in favour for the package deal they agreed in trilogues. We expect that it is easier to deliver such a majority when a package compromise is supported by big member states, namely Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland. The reason is that big countries constitute meaningful representations in the Council and EP, thereby holding the power resources necessary to form winning coalitions in the respective institutions. In the Council, their governments wield the largest voting power, being decisive in transforming a losing coalition into a winning one or blocking a decision (Warntjen, 2017). In the European Parliament, their MEPs form the largest national delegations in the two main political groups – EPP and S&D, which are pivotal in building majority coalitions in this institution (Hix and Høyland, 2013). In addition, big member states exhibit

the highest stocks of network capital in the Council, having close working relations with a large number of powerful cooperation partners (Naurin, 2007). This network resource creates more opportunities for successful coalition-building in this institution. Given the above arguments, key negotiators are therefore likely to seek the support of big member states for package deals. In doing so, however, they have to accommodate some preferences of the respective big countries into their package agreements. Hence, we expect issue linkage to increase the bargaining success of big member states due to their ability to deliver the required votes for the legislative compromise within the Council and the EP.

H5: Issue linkage increases the bargaining success of big member states.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Data

Our hypotheses are tested on the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al., 2012), the most comprehensive and widely used dataset that allows to assess member states' bargaining success on a large number of cases. DEUII contains unique information about the policy positions of member states, the Commission and the European Parliament, as well as final outcomes on 331 legislative issues nested in 125 legislative proposals. These proposals were selected according to three criteria. First, they were decided under the co-decision or consultation procedures, the two most frequently used legislative procedures. Second, they were introduced or pending in the years 1999-2000 or after the 2004 enlargement (until July 2008). Third, the selected proposals were controversial, involving at least one substantive issue between the actors and being mentioned in two news services devoted to EU affairs: *Agence Europe* and *European Voice*.

For each issue nested in the above proposals, DEUII contains the following information: 1) actors' initial policy positions measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100; 2) the level of salience each actor attached to each issue, also estimated on a scale of 0-100 where a value of 0 indicates that the issue was of no importance, while 100 indicates that the issue was of particular importance; 3) the negotiation outcome measured on a 0-100 scale. Information on controversial issues, actors' positions, saliencies and decision outcomes was gathered through interviews with key informants (see Thomson et al., 2012 for more details).

The unit of analysis in our study is the member state-issue dyad, i.e. an individual member state's position on an issue nested in a proposal. Theoretically, the number of

observations should be 331 issues*all member states ranging from 15 to 27 in the analyzed period. However, DEUII includes a small number of cases where no decision outcome exists or a country did not take its policy position on an issue. We excluded these missing observations from the analysis, mirroring the approach used in previous studies (Arregui, 2016; Arregui, Thomson, 2009; Thomson, 2011). As a result, the final dataset contains 4767 observations (member state-issue dyads) across 275 issues embedded in 113 proposals.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable in our study is *Bargaining success*, measuring the degree of member states' preference attainment in EU lawmaking. It is operationalized spatially as the absolute distance between a member state's initial policy position and the negotiated outcome on a given issue, weighted by the salience a state attached to this issue:

$$Bargaining\ Success_{ij} = \frac{|P_{ij} - Outcome_j| * S_{ij}}{100}$$

where: i – a member state; j - a legislative issue; P_{ij} – a policy position of a state i on an issue j measured on a scale from 0 to 100; $Outcome_j$ - the final outcome on an issue j on a scale of 0-100; S_{ij} – the salience attached by a state i to an issue j , measured on the 0-100 scale. We use the salience-weighted distance instead of the unweighted one since the literature sees the former as a better measure of states' bargaining success, accounting for the fact that policy preferences vary in intensity (see Arregui, 2016; Golub, 2012). Our dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100, where lower values indicate a smaller distance between a state's position and the decision outcome, thereby implying a higher level of bargaining success, while higher scores correspond to a larger distance, denoting a lower bargaining success.

Independent variables

To test the hypotheses *H1-H5*, the following independent variables were created.

H1 is tested with the variable *Package*. It is dichotomous, taking the value 1 when a proposal was decided through a multi-proposal or single proposal package deal between the EP and the Council, and 0 when no package deal was concluded. To identify the conclusion of package deals, we traced the decision-making process for each piece of legislation through the

examination of documents found in three sources: the Council's Public Register, the Eur-Lex and the European Parliament's Legislative Observatory (OEIL). A proposal was coded as a package deal when there was written evidence in the above documents of a package agreement between the EP and the Council on a single or several proposals. In addition, we create separate dummies for multi-proposal and single proposal package deals to capture their individual effect on states' bargaining success. They are included in additional model specifications. Overall, evidence of issue linkage was found in 29.6% of the legislation included in our dataset (37 proposals). Single package deals occurred in 11 proposals, whereas 26 proposals involved multi proposal package deals. On the issue level, around 34.2% of issues (94 issues) were decided through package deals, where 62 and 32 issues were resolved through cross-legislation and within-legislation logrolls, respectively.

To test *H2*, we first construct the *Extremity* variable. It measures the level of extremity of a country's preferences as the absolute distance between its policy position and the average position of all member states that have a position on an issue. A higher value means that a member state holds a more extreme position than the mainstream, while a lower score indicates that a state's preference was identical or closer to the mean. Subsequently, we interact the *Extremity* variable with the *Package* variable in order to test *H2*.

H3 is tested with the interaction between the *Package* and *Rapporteur* variables. *Rapporteur* denotes the nationality of the EP rapporteur, taking the value of 1 for member states holding the rapporteurship on a given proposal, and 0 for other states. Information about this variable was gathered from the OEIL database where the rapporteur's nationality is provided.

To test *H4*, the dichotomous *Presidency* variable is created and interacted with the *Package* variable. *Presidency* is equal to 1 for member states holding the Council Presidency in the decisive negotiations, and 0 for other countries. Inspired by Rasmussen and Reh (2013), we code the Presidency either at the time of key trilogues, during which the informal compromise on a proposal was reached, or - where trilogues were not held - when the Council adopted a political agreement.

Finally, *H5* is tested with the interaction between the *Package* and *Big member state* variables. *Big member state* takes the value of 1 for the six countries holding the highest voting power in the Council, namely Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Poland, and 0 for the remaining states.

Control variables

In addition to the explanatory variables, we include several control variables capturing the potential effect of: a) states' power resources; b) holding the status quo position; c) proximity to the positions of institutional actors, i.e. the Parliament and the Commission; d) being a new member state, e) legislative procedure, and f) issue importance.

Scholars of EU decision-making frequently expect states' bargaining success to be a function of their power resources (Arregui, 2016; Bailer, 2004; Barr and Passarelli, 2009; Cross, 2013). Therefore, we account for two sources of power: network capital and domestic constraints. Network capital refers to the depth and intensity of diplomatic relations a state has built with other EU countries (Huhe et al., 2018; Naurin, 2007). Its distribution was established by Naurin (2007) who surveyed officials from EU permanent representations, asking them to list the member states they cooperated most often with in order to develop a common position. Several studies found that states with higher network capital are more successful in reaching their preferred outcomes (Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Lundgren et al., 2019). Thus, we create the *Network capital* variable based on Naurin's (2007) measure.

The second power resource included in this analysis is domestic constraints, an idea rooted in the so-called 'paradox of weakness' (Schelling, 1960). Some scholars argue that governments can exploit difficult domestic situations to gain a bargaining advantage in EU legislative decision-making (Bailer and Schneider, 2006; Hug and König, 2002). Specifically, they can claim that their room for manoeuvre in negotiations is constrained since their national parliament would not accept significant deviations from the preference they hold, thereby putting pressure on other states to give concessions or accept a certain outcome. To operationalize domestic constraints, we create the *Parliamentary Power* variable. It measures the national parliamentary control of governments' in EU affairs, based on the index elaborated by Winzen (2012).

The literature on EU decision-making also emphasizes the location of the status quo – that is, the outcome that would occur in case of no agreement - as a relevant driver of bargaining success (Aksoy, 2010; Arregui, 2016; Costello and Thomson, 2013; König et al., 2007). It is argued that member states holding a position further from the status quo are worse positioned to attain their most preferred outcomes since they have more to lose if the negotiations fail. Hence, we create the dichotomous variable *Status quo*, being equal to 1 when a state holds the status quo position on an issue, or 0 when it does not or no status quo position exists for an issue.

Previous research also found that the proximity to the European Parliament (EP) affects states' bargaining success (Arregui, 2016; Cross, 2013). Therefore, we construct the variable *Distance to EP*. It measures the absolute distance between the position of a member state and that of the European Parliament on an issue. Next to the Parliament, the European Commission also plays a key role in the EU legislative process as this institution holds agenda-setting powers and participate in trilogues. Several studies showed that holding a preference closer to that of the Commission increases states' bargaining success (Arregui, 2016; Cross, 2013; Lundgren et al., 2019). Therefore, we design the variable *Distance to COM*, measuring the absolute distance between the policy positions taken by each member state and the positions taken by the Commission on an issue.

New member state controls the effect of the EU's 'big bang' enlargement of 2004 on states' bargaining success. It is coded as 1 for member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, and 0 for other states. This variable is included in the light of earlier research showing that new member states enjoy more bargaining success than older countries (Arregui, 2016; Arregui and Thomson, 2009).

Since our data contain issues and proposals decided under two legislative procedures, the variable *Legislative procedure* is created. It equals 1 for proposals and issues negotiated under co-decision (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), and 0 for consultation (now the special legislative procedure).


Finally, given that the issues included in the dataset may vary in terms of their importance, we control for *Issue importance*. This variable measures the number of states that took a position on an issue.

RESULTS

Descriptive analysis

Before testing the hypotheses, we conduct a descriptive analysis of bargaining success relative to package deals. Figure 1 illustrates the average bargaining successes attained by member states for issues decided through logrolling and issue-by-issue negotiations. Higher scores indicate a greater salience-weighted distance between initial positions and decision outcomes, denoting a lower level of bargaining success, while lower scores correspond to smaller salience-weighted distances from outcomes, thereby indicating higher bargaining success.

Figure 1. Average bargaining success by country under package deals (PD) and non-package deals (non-PD)



Three important patterns stem from Figure 1. First, issue linkage is not associated with a higher degree of bargaining success. The average salience-weighted distance between states’ initial positions and decision outcomes under package deals is 20.85, as opposed to 19.76 under non-package agreements. A t-test comparing these means yields a statistically insignificant p-value ($t=-1.71, p=0.090$), implying that there is no significant difference in bargaining success between these two categories of agreements. Thus, the descriptive evidence does not support our expectation that package deals increase states’ bargaining success.

Second, the average bargaining success attained under package deals is relatively equally distributed. On the scale from 0 (full success) to 100 (complete failure), member states

are concentrated in the range of 15 to 25 points, with an average of 20.85. To investigate whether the differences among countries are statistically distinguishable, we conduct two ANOVA tests, comparing the average bargaining success of states (groups) under package and non-package legislation. While the result is significant for non-package agreements ($F=2.16$, $p=0.0006$), it is not for package compromises ($F=1.36$, $p=0.1036$). This pattern also holds when we split up package deals into multi-proposal and single proposal logrolls as the ANOVA test is insignificant for both categories ($F=1.04$, $p=0.4145$ and $F=1.34$, $p=0.1226$, respectively). The above results imply that issue-by-issue negotiations produce clear winners and losers among member states, whereas package deals are generally satisfactory for all parties, generating a symmetric distribution of gains and losses. This finding supports the expectations of the logrolling theory that issue linkage generally leads to mutually advantageous compromises (Tollison and Willett, 1979).

Third, Figure 1 reveals that some states benefit more or less from package deals compared to conventional agreements. Specifically, three countries – Belgium, Bulgaria and Germany – exhibit a considerably shorter average salience-weighted distance between their positions and decision outcomes under package deals than under non-package legislation. However, t-tests comparing these distances for each of the respective countries are not significant², indicating that the three states are not substantially better off when concluding a package deal. By contrast, issue linkage seems to be particularly disadvantageous for Poland, Sweden and Estonia, as epitomized by their considerably lower bargaining success attained under package deals than under conventional agreements. The t-tests confirm that the first two countries are significantly less successful under package deals than under non-package legislation³. Overall, the descriptive analysis suggests that neither country fares considerably better when issue linkage occurs, while there is a small number of states which do substantially worse under package deals than under conventional agreements.

Explanatory analysis

To test our hypotheses, we use a multiple linear regression, mirroring the methodological approach used in previous research (Arregui, 2016;). However, as indicated above (see the ‘Data and Measurement’ section), the structure of the data is hierarchical, where the units of analysis - state-level observations of bargaining success - are nested in issues. This

² Belgium: $t=-1.386$, $p=0.167$; Bulgaria: $t=-0.866$, $p=0.392$; Germany: $t=-0.965$, $p=0.336$.

³ Estonia: $t=1.950$, $p=0.054$; Poland: $t=2.93$, $p=0.004$; Sweden: $t=3.10$, $p=0.002$.

means that the observations cannot be treated as independent as the variance in states' bargaining success may be attributable to differences between issues. This expectation is confirmed by the ANOVA test, indicating that the average states' bargaining success differs significantly across issues ($F = 8.62$, $p < 0.000$). To account for the clustered nature of the data, we apply a multi-level linear model with random effects for issues (Gelman and Hill, 2007).

Table 1. Results of multilevel linear regression – the effect of package deals on states' bargaining success

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Package	1.29 (1.58)	4.29 (1.77)**	5.16 (1.81)***
Extremity	0.46 (0.01)***	0.52 (0.02)***	0.43 (0.02)***
Package * Extremity		-0.12 (0.03)***	-0.11 (0.03)***
Rapporteur	-0.17 (1.04)	1.18 (1.27)	1.56 (1.21)
Package * Rapporteur		-4.70 (2.23)**	-5.06 (2.13)**
Presidency	-0.12 (1.11)	1.20 (1.38)	1.90 (1.32)
Package * Presidency		-4.19 (2.33)*	-4.36 (2.22)**
Big member state	1.56 (0.55)***	0.79 (0.70)	0.67 (0.80)
Package * Big member state		2.12 (1.13)*	1.52 (1.08)
Network capital			-0.23 (0.35)
Parliamentary power			-0.79 (0.43)*
Status quo position			4.53 (0.79)***
Distance to EP			0.08 (0.01)***
Distance to COM			0.10 (0.01)***
New member state			-2.61 (0.72)***
Legislative procedure			-1.35 (1.50)
Issue importance			-0.18 (0.13)
Constant	7.59 (1.02)***	6.29 (1.08)***	4.99 (2.38)**
Issue-level s.d.	11.69	11.66	11.07
BIC	40975.78	40984.69	40585.68
Log likelihood	-20454.01	-20441.53	-20208.14
Observations	4767	4767	4767

Notes: Multi-level models with random effects for issues. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2. Results of multilevel linear regression – the effect of multi-proposal and single proposal packages on states' bargaining success

	<i>Main effects</i>	<i>Multi-package interactions</i>		<i>Single package interactions</i>		<i>All interactions</i>
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Multi-package	3.92** (1.80)	6.98*** (2.01)	7.56*** (2.00)	3.94** (1.81)	4.54** (1.82)	7.90*** (2.01)
Single package	-3.71 (2.33)	-3.70 (2.31)	-2.40 (2.43)	-2.73 (2.58)	-1.90 (2.68)	-0.76 (2.69)
Extremity	0.47*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.02)	0.42*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.02)
Multi-package * Extremity		-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)			-0.14*** (0.03)
Single package * Extremity				-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Rapporteur	-0.18 (1.04)	0.84 (1.18)	1.33 (1.13)	0.01 (1.11)	0.25 (1.06)	1.60 (1.21)
Multi-package * Rapporteur		-5.02** (2.55)	-5.74** (2.43)			-6.02** (2.47)
Single package * Rapporteur				-2.12 (3.37)	-1.53 (3.22)	-2.89 (3.27)
Presidency	-0.14 (1.11)	0.94 (1.27)	1.32 (1.21)	-0.08 (1.19)	0.87 (1.14)	1.92 (1.32)
Multi-package * Presidency		-5.35** (2.64)	-4.19* (2.52)			-4.79* (2.57)
Single package * Presidency				-0.48 (3.43)	-2.91 (3.27)	-3.97 (3.34)
Big member state	1.56***	1.05*	0.83	1.45**	1.20*	0.70

	(0.55)	(0.63)	(0.75)	(0.59)	(0.73)	(0.81)
Multi-package * Big member state		2.13*	1.76			1.87
		(1.28)	(1.22)			(1.25)
Single package * Big member state				0.87	0.27	0.78
				(1.64)	(1.57)	(1.61)
Network capital			-0.26		-0.23	-0.25
			(0.35)		(0.35)	(0.35)
Parliamentary power			-0.82*		-0.81*	-0.80*
			(0.43)		(0.43)	(0.43)
Status quo position			4.86***		4.81***	4.72***
			(0.79)		(0.80)	(0.80)
Distance to EP			0.09***		0.09***	0.09***
			(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance to COM			0.09***		0.10***	0.10***
			(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
New member state			-2.48***		-2.50***	-2.56***
			(0.72)		(0.72)	(0.72)
Legislative procedure			-0.27		-0.01	-0.31
			(1.54)		(1.54)	(1.54)
Issue importance			-0.16		-0.16	-0.15
			(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Constant	7.58***	6.77***	4.43*	7.42***	5.04**	4.00*
	(1.01)	(1.03)	(2.38)	(1.02)	(2.38)	(2.39)
Issue-level s.d.	11.49	11.42	10.91	11.50	10.96	10.92
BIC	40976.03	40988.06	40588.17	41008.39	40609.50	40617.86
Log likelihood	-20449.90	-20438.98	-20205.15	-20449.15	-20215.82	-20203.06
Observations	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767

Notes: Multi-level models with random effects for issues. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table 1 presents the regression results across three different model specifications. Model 1 includes only the main effects, while Model 2 adds the interaction terms with *Package* and the other four variables – *Extremity*, *Rapporteur*, *Presidency* and *Big member state*. Model 3 supplements Model 2 with the control variables. To account for the two types of logrolling and investigate their individual impact on states’ bargaining success, we also estimate six additional models (Models 4-9), where *Package* is replaced with dummies for Multi-proposal and single proposal packages. Accordingly, Model 4 contains the main effects, that is *Multi-package*, *Single package*, *Extremity*, *Rapporteur*, *Presidency* and *Big member state*. Models 5 and 6 test the conditional effect of multi-proposal packages on states’ bargaining success: Model 5 includes the interactions between *Multi-package* and the remaining predictors, while Model 6 adds control variables. The next two models explore the conditional influence of the second type of issue linkage – single proposal packages, with model 7 including the interaction terms with *Single package* and the other four variables, and Model 8 complementing it with control variables. Finally, Model 9 contains the main effects, the interactions, and the control variables used in Models 4-8. As a robustness check, we report alternative model specifications in the Appendix, with fixed effect for countries and policy areas. The results are similar.⁴

H1 expected inter-institutional package deals to increase states’ bargaining success. This hypothesis is not confirmed in the analysis. As Table 1 shows, the effect of the *Package* variable has unexpected positive direction in all models and is even significant in Models 2 and 3. This suggests that, contrary to expectations, member states are less successful in attaining their most preferred outcomes when legislation is decided through issue linkage between the EP and the Council. On average, the conclusion of an inter-institutional package deal increases the salience-weighted distance between a state’s policy position and the final outcome by 5 points on the 0-100 policy scale (Model 3). This finding contradicts our argument derived from the theory of logrolling that package deals are mutually beneficial compromises, allowing states to enjoy a higher level of bargaining success compared to issue-by-issue negotiations.


However, a more detailed analysis reported in Table 2 suggests that the effect of issue linkage varies with the type of a package deal. The coefficient associated with the *Multi-package* variable is positive and statistically significant across all models, indicating that member states are less successful in attaining their preferred outcomes when several proposals are bundled together and decided simultaneously. The simulations presented in Table 2 reveal

⁴ In addition, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values for complex models with countries and policy areas fixed effects are higher than for the models presented in Tables 1 and 2, suggesting that the latter models fit the data better.

that decision outcomes are on average 3.92-7.90 salience-weighted points away from states' policy positions when a multi-proposal package deal is concluded. By contrast, the effect of the *Single package* variable is in the opposite direction, albeit not significant, suggesting that the exchange of favors across issues bundled in a single proposal is rather beneficial to member states.

We argue that the above results stem from the distinct nature of multi-proposal and single proposal packages. This is evidenced by previous studies that found cross-legislation and within-legislation logrolls to have different effect on legislative duration (Kirpsza, 2017), consensus formation in the Council (McKibben and Western, 2014) or the outcomes of EU inter-institutional bargaining (Kardasheva, 2013). We claim that there are at least four specific features of the two types of package deals that are responsible for their varying effect on states' bargaining success. First, cross-legislation logrolls are more complex as they contain more conflicting issues nested in several proposals and policy areas. As a result, they require longer negotiations to be adopted (Kirpsza, 2017). Second, multi-proposal package deals are more difficult to accomplish and enforce than within-legislation logrolls, as the proposals bundled in a package are negotiated by a different set of decision-makers - rapporteurs in the EP and state ministers in the Council. Given that these actors represent different parties, domestic groups or policy sectors, they are less likely to trade a loss in their policy areas (proposal) for gains in other unrelated policy areas (proposals), or accept a logroll which does not reflect the interests of their constituencies, but is beneficial for others due to trade-off (McKibben and Western, 2013: 46). Cross-legislation logrolling also poses coordination problems since ministers or rapporteurs are not always fully informed about the status of negotiations over all proposals bundled in a package. Third, multi-proposal packages are more fragile agreements as promises made across policy areas and time are less likely to be kept. Fourth, cross-legislation packaging is more confrontational than within-legislation logrolling, significantly favoring the EP over the Council. Kardasheva (2013) found that the former institution is more successful *vis-a-vis* the latter when it negotiates proposals in a package, while the conclusion of a single proposal package deal does not affect its success. The reason is that the EP often links and blocks the adoption of several proposals in order to extract significant concessions from the Council. Given this advantage and the fact that the preferences of the member states and the EP vary considerably (Thomson, 2009), cross-legislation logrolling requires member states to grant the EP more far-reaching concessions compared to within-legislation logrolling. As a result, multi-proposal package deals have a detrimental effect on states' bargaining success.

Figure 2. Effects of package deals and extremity on states' bargaining success



Consistent with *H2*, inter-institutional package deals increase the bargaining success of member states holding extreme preferences. The coefficient associated with the *Extremity* variable is positive and highly significant across all models, corroborating previous findings that extreme policy positions are disadvantageous in terms of achieving preferred outcomes

(Arregui, 2016; Bailer, 2004; Lundgren et al., 2019). However, the interaction *Package*Extremity* has a consistently negative and significant impact on bargaining success in Models 2 and 3, indicating a clear moderating effect of package deals on preference extremity. This effect is visualized in Figure 2. The coefficient of the interaction term informs that the effect of extremity is accentuated by a factor of 0.11-0.12 for legislation decided through package deals compared with that concluded *via* classical negotiations. Our finding suggests that the availability of package deals is beneficial to states with extreme preferences: while such countries are generally worse positioned to reach their ideal points, logrolling opportunities allow them to attain their extremist preferences and secure an outcome that is more favorable compared to what they could achieve in issue-by-issue negotiations.

In Table 2, we examine whether the conditioning effect of issue linkage on extremity holds for all types of package deals. We see that it does not. Both interactions *Multi-package*Extremity* and *Single package*Extremity* are in the expected direction, which is negative, but only the former is statistically significant across all specifications. This suggests that states with extreme policy positions benefit only from multi-proposal package deals, while the presence of single package deals does not improve their success significantly.

Compared to non-package legislation, package agreements are particularly beneficial to countries holding the rapporteurship on a proposal. While we found no general effect of holding a rapporteurship on bargaining success, the interaction term *Package*Rapporteur* is negative and significant at the 5% level, robust to different model specifications. This result supports our expectation that states holding the rapporteurship are more successful in getting a bargaining outcome significantly closer to their positions when a legislation is decided through package deals rather than in classical negotiations. On average, the salience-weighted distance between a state holding the rapporteurship and the final outcome decreases by about 5 points scale under package deal, as compared to no package deal (Model 3). Hence, our analysis corroborates *H3*.

However, as in the previous case, the conditioning effect of package deals on rapporteurship varies with the type of package. Again, the interaction terms *Multi-package*Rapporteur* and *Single package*Rapporteur* have expected negative signs, but only the former is significant across all specifications. This means that countries holding the rapporteurship are significantly more successful only when a multi-proposal package deal is negotiated.

Our expectation of *H4* that package deals favor countries holding the Council Presidency is also borne out. The *Package*Presidency* interaction term is negative and significant (at the 5% and 10% level) even when the control variables are added to the models.

On average, the salience-weighted distance between a Presidency and the final outcome is about 4 units lower on the 0-100 scale when a package deal is concluded compared to when it is decided in conventional negotiations. In addition, Table 2 suggests that the Council Presidency benefit more from multi-proposal package deals than single package deals, mirroring the findings related to the two previous hypotheses. Finally, models 1 and 4 with main terms reveal no general effect of being a Presidency on bargaining success: while the coefficient associated with the *Presidency* variable is in the expected direction, it is insignificant.

Overall, the tests of *H3* and *H4* back our argument based on the *relais actors* theory: package deals significantly empower the two most important *relais actors* - the rapporteur and the presidency, allowing them to successfully advocate the preferences of their countries. Since these figures negotiate package agreements in informal and secluded trilogues, they are less controllable by the institutions they represent, thereby having freedom to shape the scope of legislative exchange. In addition, *relais actors* are pivotal for the enforcement of package deals as they have to ensure the required support in the legislature for informal logrolls. Since this privileged position empowers them to determine the process of exchanging favours, they can exploit issue linkage to shape the final outcome in a way that is more favorable to their countries' preferences.

Contrary to our expectations, package deals are not advantageous for big member states. In all models, the interaction term *Package*Big member state* has an unexpected positive direction, and it is even statistically significant in Model 2, indicating that the conclusion of a package deal rather decreases the level of bargaining success attained by large countries. Moreover, in Models 1 and 4, which incorporate only the main effects, the coefficient associated with the *Big member state* variable is positive and highly significant. This result backs the conclusions of earlier studies which found that big member states are generally less successful than smaller ones (Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Golub, 2012; Kirpsza, 2021).

Moving to the control variables, network capital does not translate into greater bargaining success. While the effect of the *Network capital* variable is in the expected direction in all of the models reported in Tables 1 and 2, it is not statistically significant. This result is in line with Arregui's (2016) finding that member states with the highest stocks of network capital are not better positioned to reach their preferred outcomes.

However, we find some evidence that our second power resource – domestic constraints - is a relevant driver of states' bargaining success. Overall, our analysis indicate that states with higher levels of parliamentary control over EU policy exhibit more bargaining success. While the coefficient associated with the *Parliamentary power* variable is significant only at the 10%

level, it is still negative and significant in all specifications, indicating a robust relationship. On average, each one-unit increase in the national parliamentary control over EU issues reduces the salience-weighted distance between the final outcome and the relevant state's policy position by 0.79-0.82 points. Our finding therefore supports the so-called 'paradox of weakness' (Schelling, 1960), assuming that governments may use constraints at the domestic level to gain advantages in international negotiations. Specifically, our study suggests that member states can benefit from the pressure and control exerted by national parliaments on their European policy in order to attain more bargaining success in EU lawmaking.

Maintaining the status quo position is disadvantageous for the member states. The coefficient associated with the *Status quo position* variable is positive and significant, indicating that countries holding the status quo position are considerably further from the final outcome than the others. This result contradicts previous studies showing that states with policy positions closer to the status quo obtain more bargaining success (Aksoy, 2012; Arregui, 2016). We suspect that this difference might stem from a different operationalization of the closeness to the status quo: while previous studies measured it as the absolute distance between the positions taken by each state and the status quo, we code this variable dichotomously, i.e. whether or not a state holds the status quo position. Moreover, earlier studies have analyzed the effect of the location of the status quo on a limited data, excluding issues where no status quo position existed, while our study covers such cases.⁵

As expected, sharing preferences with the European Parliament translates into higher bargaining success. The coefficient associated with the *Distance to EP* variable is positive and significant in all models reported in Tables 1 and 2, suggesting a robust relationship. On average, each unit increase in the distance between a state's policy position and the EP's position leads to a 0.08 increase in the salience-weighted distance between that state's position and decision outcomes. This finding is consistent with previous studies which found member states to be more successful if their preferences are closer to the EP's position (Arregui, 2016; Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Cross 2013).

Similarly, the proximity to the Commission is also influential in determining states' bargaining success. The effect of the variable *Distance to COM* is positive across all models, indicating that holding preferences close to this institution is associated with a higher level of

⁵ We also used a different operationalization of the *Status quo position* variable with 1 for states holding the status quo position, 2 for states that do not maintain this position, and 3 for issues where no status quo position exists (reference category). The results hold: the effect of maintaining the status quo position is still positive and significant ($p = 0.010$).

success. If a state has completely divergent preferences with the Commission, being 100 points away from this institution's position, the salience-weighted distance between a state's policy position and the decision outcome increases by 10 salience-weighted points. Overall, the obtained results support earlier findings showing that the Commission has a strong influence on states' bargaining success in legislative negotiations (Arregui, 2016; Cross, 2013).

Our analysis reveals that new member states are more successful in achieving their preferred outcomes than old ones. The effect of the *New member state* variable is negative and significant, indicating that new member states are on average 2.61 salience-weighted points closer to the final outcomes than old countries. This result reflects earlier findings (Arregui, 2016; Arregui and Thomson, 2009).

Finally, legislative procedure and issue importance do not seem to affect states' bargaining success. None of those variables are found to be significant in Models 1-9.

CONCLUSION

In this study, we investigated how package deals concluded between the European Parliament and the Council affect member states' bargaining success in EU lawmaking. Building on the logrolling and *relais actors* theories, we delineated five hypotheses that inter-institutional logrolls a) generally increase states' bargaining success, b) favor states with extreme preferences, c) are beneficial for countries holding two privileged institutional positions - the EP rapporteur and the Council Presidency, and d) are advantageous for big member states. Our expectations were tested using multi-level linear models on the DEUII dataset.

Overall, contrary to our expectations, we found that package deals significantly decrease rather than increase member states' bargaining success, compared to conventional issue-by-issue negotiations. Interestingly, however, the detrimental effect of logrolling varies with the type of a package deal: while multi-proposal package deals make member states significantly less successful in achieving their ideal points, single proposal package deals have the opposite, albeit insignificant effect. We explained this finding by the distinct nature of the two types of issue linkage. Specifically, in contrast to single proposal package deals, cross-legislation logrolls are more complex, less enforceable and confrontational agreements as the European Parliament often blocks several proposals included in a package in order to extract concessions from the Council. These concessions are more significant than those made in within-legislation

logrolling, thereby resulting in a detrimental impact of multi-proposal package deals on states' bargaining success.

Our analysis also revealed that the effect of issue linkage on states' bargaining success is conditional upon specific factors related to the positioning of actors' preferences and holding privileged institutional positions. While package deals are generally disadvantageous to states in terms of reaching their preferred outcomes, they are particularly beneficial to countries which a) take extreme policy positions, b) hold the rapporteurship on a proposal, and c) act as the Council Presidency in the decisive legislative negotiations. Importantly, however, these conditional effects hold only for multi-proposal package deals and not for within-legislation logrolls. These results imply two important conclusions. First, while countries with extreme preferences are generally poorly positioned to achieve outcomes close to their ideal points (e.g. Arregui, 2016), this study shows that they can exploit logrolling opportunities to mitigate this disadvantage and increase the probability of attaining such preferences. Issue linkage allows them to trade concessions in issues they care less about in return for gains in issues on which they hold more extreme and intense preferences. As a corollary, they are able to realize their extremist preferences and obtain an overall compromise that is more satisfactory than what could be achieved during issue-by-issue negotiations.

Second, our findings show that the two key *relais actors* - the rapporteur and the presidency - can capitalize on issue linkage to successfully advocate the preferences of their states. The availability of package deals and the secluded setting of negotiations equip those figures with an enormous power to decide on the scope and content of legislative exchange. As a result, they are capable of shaping the overall package compromise in a way that is more beneficial for their countries. This especially holds for multi-proposal package deals, which are more complex and confrontational agreements, as indicted above.

By contrast, we did not find evidence that powerful member states, that is, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland, benefit more from the conclusion of package deals. Our analysis even suggests that big countries attain a lower level of bargaining success when logrolling occurs. This implies that powerful states, which constitute the largest representations in the EP and the Council, do not or are unable to exploit their ability to deliver majorities in order to shape the content of a package agreement in line with their own preferences.

Apart from the explanatory contribution, our study also holds theoretical and normative relevance. Theoretically, we refined the theory of logrolling by showing that the two types of package deals have varying effects on states' bargaining success due to their distinctiveness in terms of complexity, negotiating conditions, enforceability, and inter-institutional conflict they

generate. Moreover, we theorized the conditions under which issue linkage influences policy outcomes. Our study also demonstrated that the *relais actors* theory is relevant in explaining the distributional consequences of informal package deals.

Normatively, our finding that inter-institutional logrolling favors *relais actors* raises concerns about the representativeness and legitimacy of legislation decided through issue linkage. Given that package deals are negotiated in informal and secluded trilogues, rapporteurs and presidency are less controllable by their principals, being privileged to shape the scope of legislative exchange and skew legislative outcomes towards their countries' preferences at the expense of other states. As a result, their package compromises may be unrepresentative for the majority in the legislature, especially when they are offered as 'take-it-or-leave-it' option. Moreover, the informal and closed-door way of negotiating package deals hinders citizens from monitoring legislative decision-making, and thus limits their influence on the selection of issues for legislative trade and the exchange of support across them. Especially that pre-negotiated logrolls have to be approved without any amendment to become law, thus leaving little room for debates and revision. As a consequence, package deals may not always align with the citizens' preferences, in particular when they involve the exchange of losses in issues that are extremely salient to citizens in return for benefits in issues that are less important to them, but crucial for governments.

Yet, our findings showed that inter-institutional logrolling generates a relatively symmetric distribution of bargaining success among member states. In contrast to conventional issue-by-issue negotiations, which were found to produce unequivocal winners and losers, no state achieves significantly more or less of what it really wants than any other when package deals are concluded. This implies that the use of issue linkage is advantageous for the legitimacy of the EU legislative process as 'the absence of clear winners and losers is essential to the legitimacy of the EU' (Arregui and Thomson, 2009: 671). Since possible significant disparities in relative national bargaining success could undermine the value of the EU project, package deals allow to mitigate this threat by taking everyone on board through the production of mutually beneficial legislative compromises.

Our study also holds some limitations. First, the DEUII dataset includes salient files only and is limited to legislation decided between 1999 and 2009. Thus, it does not capture significant events that could have impacted bargaining outcomes, such as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 or the EU migration and financial crises. Second, since the introduction of fast-track legislation in 1999, the European Parliament has introduced more stringent rules of informal negotiations, broadening its representation for trilogues, tightening

the control over *relais actors* and increasing the transparency of trilogues (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2017). As a result, rapporteurs are more constrained to shape legislative exchange and move legislative outcomes closer to the preferences of their countries. Given that, future research needs to examine if the findings obtained also hold for less salient proposals and those adopted after 2009.

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APPENDIX

Table A. Summary statistics

	Obs	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max
Bargaining success	4767	20.20	21.95	0	100
Package	4767	0.40	0.49	0	1
Multi-package	4767	0.25	0.43	0	1
Single package	4767	0.15	0.36	0	1
Extremity	4767	25.94	21.19	0	94.44
Multi-package * Extremity	4767	6.23	15.01	0	93.33
Single package * Extremity	4767	4.06	12.80	0	94.44
Rapporteur	4767	0.06	0.24	0	1
Multi-package * Rapporteur	4767	0.01	0.11	0	1
Single package * Rapporteur	4767	0.01	0.08	0	1
Presidency	4767	0.05	0.22	0	1
Multi-package * Presidency	4767	0.01	0.11	0	1
Single package * Presidency	4767	0.01	0.08	0	1
Big member state	4767	0.29	0.45	0	1
Multi-package * Big member state	4767	0.07	0.25	0	1
Single package * Big member state	4767	0.04	0.19	0	1
Network capital	4767	1.66	1.03	.15	3.72
Parliamentary power	4767	1.55	0.67	.33	2.67
Status quo position	4767	0.23	0.42	0	1
Distance to EP	4767	46.25	39.50	0	100
Distance to COM	4767	42.63	40.65	0	100
New member state	4767	0.23	0.42	0	1
Legislative procedure	4767	0.64	0.48	0	1
Issue importance	4767	19.80	6.01	2	27

Table B. Correlations between the variables used in the analysis

	Bargaining success	Package	Multi-package	Single package	Extremity	Rapporteur	Presidency	Big member state	Network capital	Parliamentary power	Status quo position	Distance to EP	Distance to COM	New member state	Legislative procedure	Issue importance
Bargaining success	1.00															
Package	0.02	1.00														
Multi-package	0.09	0.70	1.00													
Single package	-0.07	0.51	-0.25	1.00												
Extremity	0.39	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	1.00											
Rapporteur	0.02	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	1.00										
Presidency	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.05	1.00									
Big member state	0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.07	0.22	0.08	1.00								
Network capital	0.05	-0.08	-0.04	-0.06	0.09	0.21	0.14	0.62	1.00							
Parliamentary power	-0.03	0.14	0.07	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.09	0.25	1.00						
Status quo position	0.12	0.04	-0.02	0.08	0.04	-0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.01	1.00					
Distance to EP	0.20	0.09	-0.01	0.13	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.07	0.30	1.00				
Distance to COM	0.29	0.01	0.07	-0.08	0.15	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.19	0.23	1.00			
New member state	-0.06	0.23	0.10	0.18	-0.04	-0.12	-0.08	-0.23	-0.37	0.31	0.05	0.14	0.03	1.00		
Legislative procedure	-0.03	0.08	-0.17	0.32	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	0.08	-0.00	0.14	-0.06	0.14	1.00	
Issue importance	-0.05	0.45	0.23	0.34	0.01	-0.09	-0.05	-0.14	-0.19	0.23	0.04	0.10	-0.03	0.43	0.23	1.00

Table C. Variance inflation factors and tolerances

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Network capital	2.49	0.40
Big member state	1.89	0.53
New member state	1.68	0.60
Parliamentary power	1.57	0.64
Issue importance	1.55	0.64
Single package	1.37	0.73
Multi-package	1.25	0.80
Distance to EP	1.19	0.84
Legislative procedure	1.19	0.84
Status quo position	1.13	0.88
Distance to COM	1.13	0.88
Rapporteur	1.07	0.93
Extremity	1.04	0.96
Presidency	1.02	0.97
Mean	1.40	

Table D. Alternative model specifications (*Package* variable; *Country* and *Policy Area* fixed effects)

	<i>Countries FE</i>			<i>Policy Area FE</i>			<i>Countries and Policy Area FE</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Package	1.48 (1.58)	4.54** (1.78)	5.37*** (1.81)	2.05 (1.60)	4.95*** (1.79)	4.90*** (1.84)	2.20 (1.60)	5.15*** (1.79)	5.07*** (1.84)
Extremity	0.47*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.02)	0.44*** (0.02)	0.46*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.02)
Package * Extremity		-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)		-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)		-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)
Rapporteur	-0.60 (1.06)	0.91 (1.28)	1.50 (1.23)	-0.28 (1.05)	1.05 (1.27)	1.49 (1.21)	-0.71 (1.06)	0.77 (1.28)	1.42 (1.23)
Package * Rapporteur		-5.29** (2.24)	-5.76*** (2.14)		-4.62** (2.23)	-5.02** (2.13)		-5.20** (2.24)	-5.72*** (2.14)
Presidency	-0.75 (1.16)	0.56 (1.42)	1.09 (1.36)	-0.11 (1.11)	1.22 (1.38)	1.91 (1.32)	-0.72 (1.16)	0.59 (1.42)	1.10 (1.36)
Package * Presidency		-4.40* (2.34)	-4.09* (2.23)		-4.18* (2.33)	-4.35* (2.22)		-4.38* (2.34)	-4.08* (2.23)
Big MS	-3.91** (1.52)	-4.71*** (1.58)	5.26 (5.35)	1.55*** (0.55)	0.77 (0.70)	0.67 (0.81)	-3.90** (1.52)	-4.71*** (1.58)	5.36 (5.35)
Package * Big MS		1.90* (1.15)	1.29 (1.10)		2.13* (1.13)	1.55 (1.08)		1.93* (1.15)	1.31 (1.10)
Network capital			-3.13* (1.86)			-0.23 (0.35)			-3.16* (1.86)
Parliamentary power			-2.55 (1.61)			-0.78* (0.43)			-2.37 (1.62)
Status quo position			4.52***			4.56***			4.54***

			(0.79)			(0.80)			(0.79)
Distance to EP			0.09***			0.08***			0.09***
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
Distance to COM			0.10***			0.10***			0.10***
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
New member state			-2.50			-2.57***			-2.53
			(2.16)			(0.72)			(2.16)
Legislative procedure			-1.28			1.64			1.71
			(1.50)			(2.23)			(2.23)
Issue importance			-0.15			-0.08			-0.05
			(0.13)			(0.14)			(0.14)
Constant	8.89***	7.78***	10.44***	7.12***	5.91***	2.58	8.42***	7.40***	7.81**
	(1.47)	(1.50)	(3.48)	(1.93)	(1.96)	(3.02)	(2.20)	(2.22)	(3.94)
Countries FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policy Area FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Issue-level s.d.	11.66	11.63	11.07	11.12	11.11	10.65	11.12	11.10	10.65
BIC	41137	41146	40750	41079	41088	40694	41241	41250	40859
Log likelihood	-20429	-20416	-20189	-20442	-20429	-20199	-20417	-20405	-20180
Observations	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767

Notes: Multi-level linear models with random effects for issues and fixed effects for countries and policy areas (not reported). Policy area is captured using the Commission Directorate-General (DG) primarily responsible for a proposal. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table E. Alternative model specifications (*Multi-package and Single package variables; Country and Policy Area fixed effects*)

	<i>Multi-package interactions</i>			<i>Single package interactions</i>			<i>All interactions</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Multi-package	7.60*** (2.00)	7.26*** (2.04)	7.27*** (2.04)	4.64** (1.82)	4.32** (1.87)	4.39** (1.87)	7.99*** (2.01)	7.56*** (2.06)	7.63*** (2.06)
Single package	-2.33 (2.43)	-2.60 (2.59)	-2.58 (2.59)	-1.50 (2.68)	-2.15 (2.82)	-1.81 (2.82)	-0.38 (2.69)	-1.03 (2.83)	-0.71 (2.83)
Extremity	0.42*** (0.02)	0.42*** (0.02)	0.42*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.02)	0.44*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.02)
Multi-package * Extremity	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)				-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)
Single package * Extremity				-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Rapporteur	1.17 (1.14)	1.26 (1.13)	1.09 (1.15)	0.04 (1.07)	0.19 (1.06)	-0.03 (1.07)	1.55 (1.23)	1.53 (1.21)	1.47 (1.23)
Multi-package * Rapporteur	-6.24** (2.44)	-5.68** (2.43)	-6.18** (2.44)				-6.63*** (2.48)	-5.96** (2.47)	-6.57*** (2.48)
Single package * Rapporteur				-2.27 (3.24)	-1.56 (3.22)	-2.29 (3.24)	-3.77 (3.29)	-2.90 (3.27)	-3.78 (3.29)
Presidency	0.64 (1.26)	1.33 (1.21)	0.65 (1.26)	0.14 (1.17)	0.88 (1.14)	0.16 (1.17)	1.11 (1.36)	1.92 (1.32)	1.12 (1.36)
Multi-package * Presidency	-4.09 (2.52)	-4.14* (2.52)	-4.04 (2.52)				-4.60* (2.57)	-4.74* (2.57)	-4.56* (2.57)
Single package * Presidency				-2.49 (3.29)	-2.92 (3.28)	-2.51 (3.29)	-3.45 (3.35)	-3.98 (3.34)	-3.47 (3.35)
Big MS	4.21 (5.34)	0.84 (0.75)	4.32 (5.34)	5.11 (5.35)	1.21* (0.73)	5.21 (5.36)	4.82 (5.35)	0.70 (0.81)	4.91 (5.36)
Multi-package * Big MS	1.60 (1.22)	1.75 (1.22)	1.60 (1.22)				1.65 (1.25)	1.87 (1.25)	1.65 (1.25)
Single package * Big MS				0.02	0.33	0.09	0.49	0.84	0.56

				(1.58)	(1.57)	(1.58)	(1.62)	(1.61)	(1.62)
Network capital	-2.72	-0.25	-2.74	-2.86	-0.23	-2.88	-2.97	-0.24	-2.99
	(1.86)	(0.35)	(1.86)	(1.86)	(0.35)	(1.86)	(1.86)	(0.35)	(1.86)
Parliamentary power	-2.48	-0.81*	-2.34	-2.62	-0.80*	-2.49	-2.50	-0.79*	-2.37
	(1.61)	(0.43)	(1.61)	(1.61)	(0.43)	(1.62)	(1.61)	(0.43)	(1.62)
Status quo position	4.85***	4.89***	4.87***	4.77***	4.85***	4.81***	4.68***	4.75***	4.72***
	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.80)
Distance to EP	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance to COM	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.09***	0.10***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
New member state	-2.49	-2.46***	-2.51	-2.12	-2.46***	-2.15	-2.55	-2.53***	-2.57
	(2.16)	(0.72)	(2.16)	(2.16)	(0.72)	(2.16)	(2.16)	(0.72)	(2.16)
Legislative procedure	-0.19	1.96	2.02	0.07	2.08	2.15	-0.23	1.93	1.99
	(1.54)	(2.20)	(2.20)	(1.54)	(2.21)	(2.21)	(1.54)	(2.21)	(2.21)
Issue importance	-0.13	-0.06	-0.04	-0.13	-0.06	-0.03	-0.12	-0.06	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Constant	9.42***	2.33	7.15*	10.14***	2.73	7.66*	9.20***	1.87	6.92*
	(3.48)	(3.00)	(3.93)	(3.49)	(3.00)	(3.93)	(3.49)	(3.01)	(3.93)
Countries FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Policy Area FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Issue-level s.d.	10.90	10.51	10.51	10.95	10.54	10.53	10.91	10.52	10.52
BIC	40754	40698	40864	407745	40718	40884	40783	40728	40893
Log likelihood	-20186	-20196	-20178	-20197	-20207	-20188	-20184	-20194	-20176
Observations	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767

Notes: Multi-level linear models with random effects for issues and fixed effects for countries and policy areas (not reported). Policy area is captured by the Commission Directorate-General (DG) primarily responsible for a proposal. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table F. Alternative model specifications (individual hypotheses, *Package* variable)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Package	5.08*** (1.79)	2.09 (1.80)	1.96 (1.80)	1.73 (1.83)
Extremity	0.43*** (0.02)			
Package * Extremity	-0.11*** (0.03)			
Rapporteur		1.86 (1.28)		
Package * Rapporteur		-5.77*** (2.22)		
Presidency			1.41 (1.41)	
Package * Presidency			-3.93* (2.37)	
Big member state				1.39 (0.85)
Package * Big member state				-0.03 (1.13)
Network capital	0.17 (0.27)	0.89*** (0.29)	0.86*** (0.28)	0.41 (0.38)
Parliamentary power	-1.06*** (0.40)	-1.14*** (0.43)	-1.13*** (0.43)	-0.81* (0.46)
Status quo position	4.56*** (0.79)	5.45*** (0.85)	5.45*** (0.85)	5.37*** (0.85)
Distance to EP	0.08*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Distance to COM	0.10*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)
New member state	-2.39*** (0.71)	-3.56*** (0.76)	-3.55*** (0.76)	-3.71*** (0.77)
Legislative procedure	-1.33 (1.50)	-0.10 (1.65)	-0.08 (1.65)	-0.10 (1.65)
Issue importance	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.14)
Constant	5.16** (2.38)	10.70*** (2.58)	10.87*** (2.57)	10.91*** (2.58)
Issue-level s.d.	11.08	12.23	12.23	12.22
BIC	40548.25	41206.88	41210.88	41210.11
Log likelihood	-20214.84	-20544.15	-20546.15	-20545.77
Observations	4767	4767	4767	4767

Notes: Multi-level linear models with random effects for issues. Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table G. Additional model specifications (individual hypotheses, *Multi-package* and *Single package* variables)

	<i>Extremity</i>		<i>Rapporteur</i>		<i>Presidency</i>		<i>Big member state</i>	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Multi-package	7.47*** (1.97)	4.58** (1.82)	3.97** (2.01)	3.68* (2.00)	3.89* (2.01)	3.68* (2.00)	3.44* (2.04)	3.64* (2.00)
Single package	-2.40 (2.44)	-1.96 (2.66)	-2.47 (2.69)	-2.31 (2.70)	-2.49 (2.69)	-2.42 (2.70)	-2.56 (2.69)	-2.24 (2.73)
Extremity	0.42*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.02)						
Multi-package * Extremity	-0.12*** (0.03)							
Single package * Extremity		-0.02 (0.04)						
Rapporteur			1.02 (1.19)	0.52 (1.12)				
Multi-package * Rapporteur			-4.76* (2.55)					
Single package * Rapporteur				-4.78 (3.27)				
Presidency					0.88 (1.30)	0.30 (1.21)		
Multi-package * Presidency					-3.73 (2.68)			
Single package * Presidency						-2.29 (3.48)		
Big member state							1.23 (0.80)	1.54** (0.77)

Multi-package * Big member state							0.65	
							(1.27)	
Single package * Big member state								-1.11
								(1.59)
Network capital	0.19	0.19	0.86***	0.90***	0.87***	0.87***	0.41	0.40
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Parliamentary power	-1.09***	-1.09***	-1.13***	-1.14***	-1.14***	-1.12***	-0.81*	-0.81*
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Status quo position	4.89***	4.87***	5.50***	5.47***	5.49***	5.48***	5.42***	5.41***
	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.85)
Distance to EP	0.09***	0.08***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance to COM	0.10***	0.10***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
New member state	-2.29***	-2.28***	-3.49***	-3.51***	-3.49***	-3.49***	-3.67***	-3.73***
	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.77)
Legislative procedure	-0.26	0.01	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.92	0.90	0.91
	(1.54)	(1.55)	(1.70)	(1.70)	(1.70)	(1.70)	(1.70)	(1.70)
Issue importance	-0.16	-0.17	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	4.45*	5.15**	9.91***	9.81***	9.95***	9.93***	9.98***	9.87***
	(2.38)	(2.38)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.60)
Issue-level s.d.	10.92	10.96	12.12	12.12	12.12	12.12	12.11	12.11
BIC	40549.76	40563.18	41214.18	41215.54	41215.73	41217.24	41213.87	41213.64
Log likelihood	-20211.36	-20218.07	-20543.57	-20544.25	-20544.34	-20545.10	-20543.42	-20543.30
Observations	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767	4767

Notes: Multi-level linear models with random effects for issues. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.